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Abstract
In some games, additional information hurts a player, e.g., in games with
first-mover advantage, the second-mover is hurt by seeing the first-mover’s
move. What properties of a game determine whether it has such negative
“value of information” for a particular player? Can a game have negative
value of information for all players? To answer such questions, we general-
ize the definition of marginal utility of a good to define the marginal utility
of a parameter vector specifying a game. So rather than analyze the global
structure of the relationship between a game’s parameter vector and player
behavior, as in previous work, we focus on the local structure of that relation-
ship. This allows us to prove that generically, every game can have negative
marginal value of information, unless one imposes a priori constraints on
allowed changes to the game’s parameter vector. We demonstrate these and
related results numerically, and discuss their implications.
1 Introduction
How a player in a noncooperative game behaves typically depends on what infor-
mation she has both about her physical environment and about the behavior of the
other players. Accordingly, the joint behavior of multiple interacting players can
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depend strongly on the information available to the separate players, both about
one another, and about Nature-based random variables. Precisely how the joint be-
havior of the players depends on this information is determined by the preferences
of those players. So in general there is a strong interplay among the information
structure connecting a set of players, the preferences of those players, and their
behavior.
Previous analyses of this interplay have considered how player behavior changes
under global, non-infinitesimal changes to the parameters specifying the under-
lying game. Here we pursue a different approach, generalizing the concept of
“marginal value of a good” from the setting of a single decision-maker in a game
against Nature to a multi-player setting. In other words, rather than consider the
global structure of the relationship between the game parameters and player behav-
ior, we focus on the local structure of that relationship.
This analysis of the local structure allows us construct general theorems on
when there is a change to an information structure that will reduce information
available to a player but increase their expected utility. It also allows us to construct
extended “Pareto” versions of these theorems, specifying when there is a change to
an information structure that will both reduce information available to all players
and increase all of their expected utilities.
We illustrate these theoretical results with computer experiments involving the
noisy leader-follower game. We also discuss the general implications of these re-
sults for well-known issues in the economics of information.
1.1 Value of information
Intuitively, it might seem that a rational decision maker cannot be hurt by addi-
tional information. After all, that is the standard interpretation of Blackwell’s fa-
mous result that adding noise to an observation by sending it through an additional
channel, called garbling, cannot improve expected utility of a Bayesian decision
maker in a game against Nature [6]. However games involving multiple players,
and/or bounded rational behavior, might violate this intuition.
To investigate the legitimacy of this intuition for general noncooperative games,
we first need to formalize what it means to have “additional information”. To
begin, consider the simplest case, of a single-player game. We can compare two
scenarios: One where the player can observe a relevant state of Nature, and another
situation that is identical, except that now she cannot observe that state of Nature.
More generally, we can compare a scenario where the player receives a noisy signal
about the state of Nature to a scenario that is identical except that the signal she
receives is strictly noisier (in a certain sense) than in the first scenario. Indeed, in
his seminal paper [6], Blackwell proved that the set of changes to an information
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channel that can never increase the expected utility of the player are precisely those
that are equivalent to sending the signal through an additional channel, and thereby
introducing extra noise. So at least in a game against Nature, one can usefully
define the “value of information” as the difference in highest expected utility that
can be achieved in a low noise scenario (more information) compared to a high
noise scenario (less information) [14], and prove important properties about this
value of information.
In trying to extend this reasoning from a single player game to a multi-player
game two complications arise. First, in a multi-player game there can be multiple
equilibria, with different expected utilities from one another. All of those equilib-
ria will change, in different ways, when noise is added to an information channel
connecting players in the game. Indeed, even the number of equilibria may change
when noise is added to a channel. This means there is no well-defined way to com-
pare equilibrium behavior in a “before” scenario with equilibrium behavior in an
“after” scenario in which noise has been added; there is arbitrariness in which pair
of equilibria, one from each scenario, we use for the comparison. Note that there is
no such ambiguity in a game against Nature. (In addition, this ambiguity does not
arise in the Cournot scenarios discussed below if we restrict attention to subgame
perfect equilibria.)
A second complication is that in a multi-player game all of the players will
react to a change in an information channel, if not directly then indirectly, via the
strategic nature of the game. This effect can even result in a negative value of
information, in that it means a player would prefer less (i.e., noisier) information.
Indeed, such negative value of information can arise even when both the “before”
and “after” scenarios have unique (subgame perfect) equilibria, so that there is no
ambiguity in choosing which two equilibria to compare.
To illustrate this, consider the Cournot duopoly where two competing manu-
facturers of a good simultaneously choose a production level. Note that, as far as
its equilibrium structure is concerned, this scenario is equivalent to one player —
the “leader” — choosing his production level first, but the other player, the “fol-
lower”, having no information about the leader’s choice before making her choice.
Assuming that both players can produce the good for the same cost and that the
demand function is linear, it is well known that in that equilibrium both players get
the same profit.
Now change the game by having the follower observe the leader’s move be-
fore she moves. So the only change is that the follower now has more information
before making her move. In this new game, the leader can choose a higher produc-
tion level compared to the production level of the simultaneous move game — the
monopoly production level — and the follower has to react by choosing a lower
production level. Thus, the follower is actually hurt by this change to the game that
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Figure 1: Both the expected utility of player i and the amount of information player
i receives depend, in part, on the strategy profile of all the players, σ. Via the
equilibrium concept, that profile in turn depends on the specific conditional dis-
tributions θ in the information channel providing data to player i. So a change
to θ results in a coupled change to the expected utility of player i, Eθ[ui], and to
the amount of information in their channel, f (θ). The “marginal value of infor-
mation” to i is how much Eθ(ui) changes per unit change in f (θ) if θ is changed
infinitesimally.
results in her having more information.
In this example, the leader changes his move to account for the information
that (he knows that) the follower will receive. Then, after receiving this informa-
tion, the follower cannot credibly ignore it, i.e., cannot credibly behave as in the
simultaneous move game equilibrium. So this equilibrium of the new game, where
the follower is hurt by the extra information, is subgame-perfect. These and several
other examples of negative value of information can be found in the game theory
literature (see section 1.6 for references).
In this paper we introduce a broad framework that overcomes these two com-
plications which distinguish multi-player games from single-player games. This
framework is based on generalizing the concept of the “marginal value of a good”,
to a decision-maker in a game against Nature, so that it can apply to multi-player
game scenarios. This means that in our approach, the “before” and “after” sce-
narios traditionally used to define value of information in games against Nature are
infinitesimally close to one another. More precisely, we consider how much the ex-
pected utility of a player changes per unit change in the amount of information as
one infinitesimally changes the conditional distribution specifying the information
channel in a game. (This is illustrated in Fig. 1.) Interestingly, such a local picture
is widely used in decision theory, i.e. marginal value, but has, to our knowledge not
been considered in game theory. Instead, as in the example above, investigations
of value of information have been based exclusively on comparing global changes
to the information structure, e.g. no vs. full information.
In the next subsection we provide a careful motivation for our “marginal value
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of information” approach. As we discuss in the following subsection, this requires
us to choose a cardinal measure of amount of information as well as a way to
relate infinitesimal changes in utility to infinitesimal changes in information. Next
we discuss the broad benefits of our approach, e.g., as a way to quantify marginal
rates of substitution of different kinds of information arising in a game. After this
we relate our framework to previous work. We end this section by providing a
roadmap to the rest of our paper.
1.2 From consumers making a choice to multi-player games
To motivate our framework, first consider the simple case of a consumer whose
preference function depends jointly on the quantities of all the goods they get in
a market. Given some current bundle of goods, how should we quantify the value
they assign to getting more of good j? The usual economic answer is the marginal
utility of good j to the consumer, i.e., the derivative of their expected utility with
respect to amount of good j.
Rather than ask what the marginal value of good j is to the consumer, we might
ask what their marginal value is for some linear combination of j and a different
good j′. The natural answer is their “marginal value”, i.e. is the marginal utility of
that precise linear combination of goods.
More generally, rather than considering the marginal value to the consumer of
a linear combination of the goods, we might want to consider the marginal value
to them of some arbitrary, perhaps non-linear function of quantities of each of the
goods. What marginal value would they assign to that?
To ground our thinking, consider an example where the function is the total
weight of all the goods. What would be the “value of weight”? To answer this
question, write the bundle of goods the consumer possesses as θ, i.e. θ j is the
amount of good j. Then write the consumer’s expected utility as V(θ), and the
weight of the bundle as the function f (θ). We want to relate how the utility changes
when the weight of the bundle is changed infinitesimally.
In general, there is no unique such relation since the weight f is a scalar-valued
function and thus different changes δθ to the bundle could lead to the same change
in the weight of the bundle, even though they might result in different changes
to the expected utility. So to answer our question we need to fix the direction of
change δθ to the bundle of goods. Once we have done that, then to first-order the
utility changes by 〈gradV, δθ〉 while the weight is changed by 〈grad f , δθ〉.1
1Here and throughout, 〈·, ·〉 denotes a dot product, grad f is the gradient of f and 〈grad f , δθ〉
gives the length of the gradient vector when projected onto the direction δθ.
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Accordingly we define the “differential value of f (in the direction δθ)” as
〈gradV, δθ〉
〈grad f , δθ〉 (1)
Thus, a change to the bundle has a high differential value of f , e.g. of weight, when
that change (in the direction δθ) results in a large gain in utility for a small change
in f .
In some situations one might wish to speak of the “value of f ” without speci-
fying a specific direction of change to the vector-valued argument of f . Indeed, all
previous quantifications of “value of information” that we know of, both in game
theory and in other fields (e.g., analysis of influence diagrams [14, 18]), quantifies
value of information without specifying a direction.
We can extend our approach to provide such a “direction-free” quantification
of value of information, by choosing the direction δθ = grad f which results in the
largest change of f , i.e. steepest ascent. Thus, we can quantify the “differential
value of f ” as
〈grad(V), grad f 〉
||grad f ||2 (2)
The measure in (2) says that if a small change in the value of f leads to a big change
in expected utility, f is more valuable than if the same change in expected utility
required a bigger change in the value of f . Furthermore, it expresses the value of
information in units of value (of an infinitesimal change to f ) per unit of f . Thus,
we follow the conventional terminology where we would typically say that how
much the consumer values a change to good j is given by the associated change in
utility divided by the amount of change in good j. (After all, that tells us change in
utility per unit change in the good.)
All of the reasoning above can be carried over from the case of a single con-
sumer to apply to multi-player scenarios. To see how, first note that in the reasoning
above, θ is simply the parameter vector determining the utility of the consumer.
In other words, it is the parameter vector specifying the details of a game being
played by a decision maker in a game against Nature. So it naturally generalizes to
a multi-player game, as the parameter vector specifying the details of such a game.
Next, replace the consumer player in the reasoning above by a particular player
in the multi-player game. The key to the reasoning above is that specifying θ
specifies the expected utility of the consumer player. In the case of the consumer,
that map from parameter vector to expected utility is direct. In a multi-player
game, that direct map becomes an indirect map specified in two stages: First by
the equilibrium concept, taking θ to the mixed strategy profile of all the players,
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and then from that profile to the expected utility of any particular player. (Cf.,
Fig. 1.)
As mentioned above though, there is an extra complication in the multi-player
case that is absent in the case of the single consumer. Typically multi-player games
have multiple equilibria for any θ, and therefore multiple values of V(θ). (In Fig. 1,
the map from θ to the mixed strategy profile is multi-valued in games with multiple
players.) However we need to have the mapping from θ to the expected utility of
the players be single-valued to use the reasoning above. This means that we have
to be careful when calculating derivatives to specify which precise branch of the
set of equilibria we are considering. Having done that, our generalization from the
definition of marginal utility for the case of a consumer choosing a bundle of goods
to marginal utility for a player in a multi-player game is complete.
1.3 General comments on the marginal value approach
There are several aspects of this general framework that are important to empha-
size. First, there is no reason to restrict attention to Nash equilibria (or some ap-
propriate refinement). All that we need is that θ specifies (a set of) equilibrium
expected utilities for all the players. The equilibrium concept can be anything at
all.
Second, note that θ, together with the solution concept and choice of an equi-
librium branch, specifies the mixed strategy profile of the players, as well as all
prior and conditional probabilities. So it specifies the distributions governing the
joint distribution over all random variables in the game. Accordingly, it specifies
the values of all cardinal functions of that joint distribution. So in particular, how-
ever we wish to quantify “amount of information”, so long as it is a function of
that joint distribution, it is an indirect function of θ (for a fixed solution concept
and associated choice of a solution branch). This means we can apply our analysis
for any such quantification of the amount of information as a function f (θ).
We have to make several choices every time we use our approach. One is that
we must choose what parameters of the game to vary. In addition, when analyzing
value of information in a particular direction, we have to specify that direction.
Taken together these choices fix what economic question we are considering. Sim-
ilar choices (e.g., of what game parameters to allow to vary) arise, either implicitly
or explicitly, in any economic modeling. Furthermore, we must decide what infor-
mation measures we wish to analyze. (We address this issue in the next subsection.)
Finally, if we wish to analyze value of information we confront an additional,
purely formal choice, unique to analyses of marginal values. This is the choice of
what coordinate system to use to evaluate the dot products and gradients in Eq. (2).
The difficulty is that changing the coordinate system changes the values of both dot
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products2 and gradient vectors in general. So different choices of coordinate system
would give different marginal values of information. However since the choice of
coordinate system is purely a modeling choice, we do not want our conclusions
to change if we change how we parametrize the noise level in a communication
channel, for example.
To address this problem we need to introduce a metric, as in differential geome-
try. In different economic scenarios, different choices of metric may be appropriate.
In general, they can change our results.
Here, for reasons of space, we concentrate on metric-independent results. Dif-
ferential value of information at a particular θ depends on the choice of metric in
general.3 However the differential value of information in a given direction does
not depend on the metric (or coordinate system) as explained in section 3. Ac-
cordingly, in this paper we restrict attention to differential value of information in
a given direction.
1.4 How to quantify information
To use the framework outlined in Sec. 1.2, we must choose a function f (θ) that
measures the amount of information in a game with parameter θ. Traditionally,
a player’s information is represented in game theory by a signal that the player
receives during the game4. Thus information is often thought of as an object or
commodity. But this general approach does not integrate the important fact that
a signal is only informative to the extent that it changes what the player believes
about some other aspect of the game. It is the relationship between the value
of the signal and that other aspect of the game that determines the “amount of
information” in the signal.
More precisely, let y, sampled from a distribution p(y), be a payoff-relevant
variable whose state player i would like to know before making her move, but
2To give a simple example that the dot product can change depending on the choice of coordinate
system, consider the two Cartesian position vectors (1, 0) and (0, 1). Their dot product in Cartesian
coordinates equals 0. However if we translate those two vectors into polar coordinates we get (1, 0)
and (1, pi/2). The dot product of these two vectors is 1, which differs from 0, as claimed.
3Indeed, in some circumstances changing the metric can change differential value of information
from being positive to being negative. This is just a specific instance of the general phenomena that
the change in the value of a function V(θ) for an infinitesimal step in θ along a gradient of a second
function f (θ) may change from positive to negative, for certain kinds of change to the metric. This
is ultimately due to the fact that the metric specifies the shape of the ellipsoid specifying all points θ′
that lie an “infinitesimal distance” from some current point θ, and therefore specifies the direction of
the gradient of f (θ).
4This includes information partitions, in the sense that the player is informed about which element
of her information partition obtains.
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which she cannot observe directly. Say that the value y is used to generate a da-
tum/signal x, that the player directly observes, via a conditional distribution p(x | y)
which we typically refer to as an information channel. If for some reason the player
ignored x, then she would assign the a-priori likelihood p(y) to y, even though in
fact its a-posteriori likelihood is p(y | x) = p(y)p(x|y)∑
y′ p(y′)p(x|y′) . This change in the likeli-
hoods she would assign to y is a measure of the information that x provides about
y. Arguably, this change of distribution is the core property of information that is
of interest in economic scenarios.
Averaging over observation x and state y’s, and working in log space, this
change in the likelihood she would assign to the actual y if she ignored x (and
so used likelihoods p(y) rather than p(y | x)) is
∑
x,y
p(x)p(y | x) ln
[ p(y | x)
p(y)
]
. (3)
Thus, eq. (3) gives the (average) increase in information that player i has about
y due to observing x. Note that this is true no matter how the variables X and Y
arise in the strategic interaction. In particular, this interpretation of the quantity
in Eq. (3) does not require that the value x arise directly through a pre-specified
distribution p(x | y). x and y could instead be variables concerning the strategies of
the players at a particular equilibrium.
In this sense, we have shown that the quantity in Eq. (3) is a proper way to
measure the information relating any pair of variables arising in a strategic sce-
nario. None of the usual axiomatic arguments motivating Shannon’s information
theory [24, 10] were used in doing this. Nevertheless, the quantity in Eq. (3) is just
the mutual information between X and Y , as defined by Shannon. Mutual informa-
tion, together with the related quantity of entropy, forms the basis of information
theory. It not only allows us to quantify information, but has many applications
in different areas ranging from coding theory to machine learning to evolutionary
biology.
In game theory, information is more commonly expressed in terms of an infor-
mation partition. An information partition {A1, . . . ,An} (on some measure space
Ω) can be viewed as a random variable with values x ∈ X = {1, . . . , n}, i.e. the sig-
nal x reveals which element of the partition was hit. Coarsening that partition can
then be considered as a (deterministic) information channel p(y | x) from x ∈ X to
a value y ∈ Y in the coarser partition. Now when we want to evaluate how much
information the agent obtains from the coarser partition Y about some other ran-
dom variable N, e.g. corresponding to a state of Nature, we see that N → X → Y is
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a Markov chain5. Thus, the data-processing inequality6 applies and the mutual in-
formation between N and Y cannot exceed the mutual information between N and
X. So by using mutual information, we can not only state that the amount of in-
formation is reduced when an information partition is coarsened, but also quantify
by how much. Furthermore, in this way, mutual information provides a cardinal
measure that is compatible with the partial order based on coarsening information
partitions.
When the distributions of X or Y are not fixed, as they might correspond to
moves of players in a game, it it more natural to consider the information than
can potentially transmitted by the channel. In information theory this is measured
by the channel capacity C of an information channel p(y | x) from X to Y as
C = maxp(X) I(X; Y). Unfortunately, in general we cannot solve the maximization
problem defining information capacity analytically. So closed formulas for the
channel capacity are only known for special cases. This in turn means that partial
derivatives of the channel capacity with respect to the channel parameters are diffi-
cult to calculate in general. One special case where one can make that calculation
is the binary (asymmetric) channel[1]. For this reason, we will use that channel in
the examples considered in this paper that involve marginal value of information
capacity.7
While mutual information and channel capacity will be the typical choices of
f in our computer experiments presented below, our general theorems hold for ar-
bitrary choices of f , even those that bear no relation to concepts from Shannon’s
information theory. Note that even once we decide to use information theoretic
quantities of a signal to quantify information, we must still make the essentially
arbitrary choice of which signal, to which player, concerning which other variable,
we are interested in. So for example, we might be interested in the mutual infor-
mation between some state of Nature and the move of player 1. Or the channel
capacity between the original move of player 1 and the last move of player 1.
5X → Y → Z are said to form a Markov chain when p(x, y, z) = p(x)p(y | x)p(z | y).
6The data processing inequality is an important theorem in information theory which shows that
information can not be increased by processing it (via an information channel p(z | y)).
Theorem. Let X → Y → Z form a Markov chain. Then, I(X; Y) ≥ I(X; Z)
7Another important class of information channels with known capacity are the so called sym-
metric channels [10]. In this case, the noise is symmetric in the sense that it does not depend on
a particular input, i.e. the channel is invariant under relabeling of the inputs. This class is rather
common in practice and includes channels with continuous input, e.g. the Gaussian channel.
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1.5 Benefits of the marginal value approach
This approach of making infinitesimal changes to information channels and exam-
ining the ramifications on expected utility is very general and can be applied to
any information channel in the game. That means for example that we can add
infinitesimal noise to an information channel that models dependencies between
different states of Nature and examine the resultant change in the expected utility
of a player. As another example, we can change the information channel between
two of the players in the game, and analyze the implications for the expected utility
of a third player in the game.
In fact, the core idea of this approach extends beyond making infinitesimal
changes to the noise in a channel. At root, what we are doing is making an in-
finitesimal change to the parameter vector that specifies the noncooperative game.
This differential approach can be applied to other kinds of infinitesimal changes
besides those involving noise vectors in communication channels. For example, it
can be applied to a change to the utility function of a player in the game (see exam-
ple 3). As another example, the changes can be applied to the rationality exponent
of a player under a logit quantal response equilibrium [25]. This flexibility allows
us to extend Blackwell’s idea of “value of information” far beyond the scenarios he
had in mind, to (differential) value of any defining characteristics of a game. This
in turn allows us to calculate marginal rates of substitution of any component of a
game’s parameter vector with any other component, e.g., the marginal rate of sub-
stitution for player i of (changes to) a specific information channel and of (changes
to) a tax applied to player j.
More generally still, there is nothing in our framework that requires us to con-
sider marginal values to a player in the game. So for example, we can apply our
analysis to calculate marginal social welfare of (changes to) information channels,
etc. Carrying this further, we can use our framework to calculate marginal rates
of substitution in noncooperative games to an external regulator concerned with
social welfare who is able to change some parameters in the game.
In this context, the need to specify a particular branch of the game is a benefit
of the approach, not a shortcoming. To see why, consider how a (toy model of a
regulator) concerned with social welfare would set some game parameters, accord-
ing to conventional economics analysis. The game and associated set of parameter
vectors is considered ab initio, and an attempt is made to find the global optimal
value of the parameter vector. However whenever the game has multiple equilib-
rium branches, in general what parameter vector is optimal will depend on which
branch one considers — and there is no good generally applicable way of predict-
ing which branch will be appropriate, since that amounts to choosing a universal
refinement.
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However our framework provides a different way for the regulator to control
the parameter vector. The idea is to start with the actual branch that gives an actual,
current player profile for a currently implemented parameter vector θ. We then tell
the regulator what direction to incrementally change that parameter vector given
that the players are on that branch. No attempt is made to find an ab initio global
optimum. So this approach avoids the problem of predicting what branch will arise
— we use the one that is actually occurring. Furthermore, the parameters can then
be changed along a smooth path leading the players from the current to the desired
equilibrium (see [30] for an example of this idea).
1.6 Previous work
In his famous theorem, Blackwell formulated the imperfect information of the deci-
sion maker concerning the state of Nature as an information channel from the move
of Nature to the observation of the decision maker, i.e., as conditional probability
distribution, leading from the move of Nature to the observation of the decision
maker. This is a very convenient way to model such noise, from a calculational
standpoint. As a result, it is the norm for how to formulate imperfect information
in Shannon information theory [10, 24], which analyses many kinds of informa-
tion, all formulated as real-valued function of probability distributions. Indeed,
use of conditional distributions to model imperfect information is the norm in all
of engineering and the physical sciences, e.g., computer science, signal processing,
stochastic control, machine learning, physics, stochastic process theory, etc.
There were some early attempts to use Shannon information theory in eco-
nomics to address the question of the value of information. Except for special
cases such as multiplicative payoffs (Kelly gambling [16]) and logarithmic utili-
ties [2], where the expected utility will be proportional to the Shannon entropy,
the use of Shannon information was considered to provide no additional insights.
Indeed, Radner and Stiglitz [27] rejected the use of any single valued function to
measure information because it provides a total order on information and therefore
allows for a negative value of information even in the decision case considered by
Blackwell.
In multi-player game theory, i.e. multi-agent decision situations, the role of in-
formation is even more involved. Here, many researchers have constructed special
games, showing that the players might prefer more or less information depend-
ing on the particular structure of the game (see [23] for an early example). This
work showed that Blackwell’s result cannot directly be generalized to situations of
strategic interactions.
Correspondingly, the most common formulation of imperfect information in
game theory does not use information channels let alone Shannon information. In-
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stead, states of Nature are lumped using information partitions specifying which
states are indistinguishable to an agent. In this approach, more (less) information
is usually modeled as refining (coarsening) an agent’s information partition. In par-
ticular, noisy observations are formulated using such partitions in conjunction with
a (common) prior distribution on the states of Nature. Even though, this is formally
equivalent to conditional distributions, it leads to a fundamentally different way of
thinking about information. The formulation of information in terms of informa-
tion partitions provides a natural partial order based on refinining partitions. Thus,
in contrast to Shannon information theory, which quantifies the amount of informa-
tion, it cannot compare the information whenever the corresponding partitions are
not related via refiniments. In addition, the avoidance of conditional distributions
makes many calculations more difficult.
Recently, some work in game theory has made a distinction between the “ba-
sic game”and the “information structure”8: The basic game captures the available
actions, the payoffs and the probability distribution over the states of Nature, while
the information structure specifies what the players believe about the game, the
state of Nature and each other (see for instance [21, 5]). More formally this is
expressed in games of incomplete information having each player observing a sig-
nal, drawn from a conditional probability distribution, about the state of Nature.
In principle these signals are correlated. The effects of changes in the information
structure were studied by considering certain types of garbling nodes as by Black-
well. While this goes beyond refinements of information parttions, it still only
provides a partial order of information channels.
Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya [21] showed that if two information structures
are equivalent with respect to a specific garbling the game will have the same equi-
librium outcomes. Thus, they characterized the class of changes to the informa-
tion channels that leave the players indifferent with respect to a particular solution
concept. Similarly, Bergemann and Morris [5] introduced a Blackwell-like order
on information structures called “individual sufficiency” that provides a notion of
more and less informative structures, in the sense that more information always
shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. A similar analysis relating the set of
equilibria between different information structures has been obtained by Gossner
[12] and is in line with his work [13] relating more knowledge of the players to
an increase of their abilities, i.e. the set of possible actions available to them. As
formulated in this work, more information can be seen to increase the number of
constraints on a possible solution for the game.
Overall, the goal of these attempts has been to characterize changes to infor-
mation structures which imply certain properties of the solution set, independent
8According to Gossner [12] this terminology goes back to Aumann.
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of the particular basic game. This is clearly inspired by Blackwell’s result which
holds for all possible decision problems. So in particular, these analyses aim for
results that are independent of the details of the utility function(s). Moreover, the
analyses are concerned with results that hold simultaneously for all solution points
(branches) of a game. Given these constraints on the kinds of results one is inter-
ested in, as observed by Radner and Stiglitz, Shannon information (or any other
quantification of information) is not of much help.
In contrast, we are concerned with analyses of the role of information in strate-
gic scenarios that concern a particular game with its particular utility functions.
Indeed, our analyses focus on a single solution point at a time, since the role of
information for the exact same game game will differ depending on which solution
branch one is on. Arguably, in many scenarios regulators and analysts of a strategic
scenario are specifically interested in the actual game being played, and the actual
solution point describing the behavior of its players. As such, our particularized
analyses can be more relevant than broadly applicable analyses, which ignore such
details.
While not being much help in the broadly applicable analyses of Bergemann
and Morris [5], Gossner [12, 13], etc., we argue below that Shannon information
is useful if one wants to analyze the role of information in a particular game with
its specific utility functions. In this case, the idea of marginal utility of a good
to a decision-maker in a particular game against Nature can be naturally extended
“marginal utility” of information to a player in a particular multi-player game on a
particular solution branch of that game. Thus, one is naturally lead to a quantitative
notion of information and the differential value of information as elaborated above.
1.7 Roadmap
In Sec. 2, we review Multi-Agent Influence Diagrams (MAIDs) and explain why
they are especially suited to study information in games. Next, we introduce quan-
tal response equilibria of MAIDs and show how to calculate partial derivatives of
the associated strategy profile with respect to components of the associated game
parameter vector.
Based on these definitions, in Sec. 3 we define the differential value of informa-
tion and in Sec. 4 we prove that generically, in all games there is such a direction
in which information is decreased. Here, generic refers to the parametrization of
the game, i.e. we do not assume any a priori constraints on how the channel’s con-
ditional distribution can be changed. In this sense, we prove that in all games, i.e.
for any type of utility, e.g. zero-sum, and any structure, simultaneous or sequential,
there is (a way to infinitesimally change the channel that has) negative value of in-
formation. Similarly, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a game to
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have negative value of information simultaneously for all players. (This condition
can be viewed as a sort of“Pareto negative value of information”.)
Next, in Sec. 5 we illustrate our proposed definitions and results in a sim-
ple decision situation as well as an abstracted version of the duopoly scenario that
was discussed above, in which the second-moving player observes the first-moving
player through a noisy channel. In particular, we show that as one varies the noise
in that channel, the differential value of information is indeed sometimes negative
for the second-moving player, for certain starting conditional noise distributions in
the channel (and at a particular equilibrium). However for other starting distribu-
tions in that channel (at the same equilibrium), the differential value of information
is positive for that player. In fact, all four pairs of {positive / negative} marginal
value of information for the {first / second} – moving player can occur.
After this we present a section giving more examples. We end with a discussion
of future work and conclusions.
A summary of the notation we use is provided in Table. 1.
2 Multi-agent influence diagrams
Bayes nets [17] provide a very concise, powerful way to model scenarios where
there are multiple interacting Nature players (either automata or inanimate natural
phenomena), but no human players. They do this by representing the information
structure of the scenario in terms of a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) with con-
ditional probability distributions at the nodes of the graph. In particular, the use
of conditional distributions rather than information partitions greatly facilitates the
analysis and associated computation of the role of information in such systems.
As a result they have become very wide-spread in machine learning and informa-
tion theory in particular, and in computer science and the physical sciences more
generally.
Influence Diagrams (IDs [14]) were introduced to extend Bayes nets to model
scenarios where there is a (single) human player interacting with Nature players.
There has been much analysis of how to exploit the graphical structure of the ID
to speed up computation of the optimal behavior assuming full rationality, which
is quite useful for computer experiments.
More recently, Multi-Agent Influence Diagrams (MAIDs [18]) and their vari-
ants like semi-net-form games [19, 3, 20] and Interactive POMDP’s [11] have ex-
tended IDs to model games involving arbitrary numbers of players. As such, the
work on MAIDs can be viewed as an attempt to create a new game theory repre-
sentation of multi-stage games based on Bayes nets, in addition to strategic form
and extensive form representations.
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Information theory
X,Y Sets
x, y Elements of sets, i.e. x ∈ X
X,Y Random variables with outcomes in X,Y
∆X Probability simplex over X.
I(X; Y) Mutual information between X and Y
Differential geometry
v, θ Vectors
vi i-th entry of contra-variant vector
vi i-th entry of co-variant vector
gi j Metric tensor. Its inverse is denoted by gi j.
∂
∂θi
Partial derivative wrt/ θi
grad( f )i = gi j ∂
∂θi
Gradient of f , i.e. contra-variant direction of steepest ascent
∇∇ f Hessian of f
〈v,w〉g Scalar product of v,w wrt/ metric g
|v|g Norm of vector v wrt/ metric g
Multi-agent influence diagrams
G = (V,E) Directed acyclic graph with verticesV and edges E ⊂ V ×V
Xv State space of node v ∈ V
N Set of Nature or change nodes, i.e. N ⊂ V
Di Set of decision nodes of player i
pa(v) = {u : (u, v) ∈ E} Parents of node v
p(xv | xpa(v)) Conditional distribution at Nature node v ∈ N
σi(av | xpa(v)) Strategy of player i at decision node v ∈ Di
ui Utility function of player i
E(ui | ai) Conditional expected utility of player i
Vi = E(ui) Value, i.e. expected utility, of player i
Differential value of information
Vδθ Differential value of direction δθ
V f ,δθ Differential value of f in direction δθ
V f Differential value of f
Con({vi}) Conic hull of nonzero vectors {vi}
Con({vi})⊥ Dual to the conic hull Con({vi})
Table 1: Summary of notation used throughout the paper.
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Compared to these older representations, typically MAIDs more clearly ex-
press the interaction structure of what information is available to each player in
each possible state.9 They also very often require far less notation than those other
representations to fully specify a given game. Thus, we consider them as a natural
starting point when studying the role of information in games.
A MAID is defined as follows:
Definition 1. An n-player MAID is defined as a tuple (G, {Xv}, {p(xv | xpa(v))}, {ui})
of the following elements:
• A directed acyclic graph G = (V,E) whereV = D∪N is partitioned into
– a set of Nature or chance nodes N and
– a set of decision nodes D which is further partitioned into n sets of
decision nodesDi, one for each player i = 1, . . . , n,
• a set Xv of states for each v ∈ V,
• a conditional probability distribution p(xv | xpa(v)) for each Nature node
v ∈ N , where pa(v) = {u : (u, v) ∈ E} denotes the parents of v and xpa(v) is
their joint state.
• a family of utility functions {ui : ∏v∈V Xv → R}i=1,...,n.
In particular, as mentioned above, a one-person MAID is an influence diagram
(ID [14]).
In the following, the states xv ∈ Xv of a decision node v ∈ D will usually be
called actions or moves, and sometimes will be denoted by av ∈ Xv. We adopt
the convention that “p(xv | xpa(v))” means p(xv) if v is a root node, so that pa(v) is
empty. We write elements of X as x. We define XA ≡ ∏v∈AXv for any A ⊆ V,
with elements of XA written as xA. So in particular, XD ≡ ∏v∈DXv, and XN ≡∏
v∈N Xv, and we write elements of these sets as xD (or aD) and xN , respectively.
We will sometimes write an n-player MAID as (G,X, p, {ui}), with the decom-
positions of those variables and associations among them implicit. (So for example
the decomposition ofG in terms of E and a set of nodes [∪i=1,...,nDi]∪N will some-
times be implicit.)
A solution concept is a map from any MAID (G,X, p, {ui}) to a set of condi-
tional distributions {σi(xv | xpa(v)) : v ∈ Di, i = 1, . . . , n}. We refer to the set of
distributions {σi(xv | xpa(v)) : v ∈ Di} for any particular player i as that player’s
9In a MAID a player has information at a decision node A about some state of Nature X if there
is a directed edge from X to A.
17
strategy. We refer to the full set {σi(xv | xpa(v)) : v ∈ Di, i = 1, . . . , n} as the strat-
egy profile. We sometimes write σv for a v ∈ Di to refer to one distribution in a
player’s strategy and use σ to refer to a strategy profile.
The intuition is that each player can set the conditional distribution at each of
their decision nodes, but is not able to introduce arbitrary dependencies between
actions at different decision nodes. In the terminology of game theory, this is called
the agent representation. The rule for how the set of all players jointly set the
strategy profile is the solution concept.
In addition, we allow the solution concept to depend on parameters. Typically
there will be one set of parameters associated with each player. When that is the
case we sometimes write the strategy of each player i that is produced by the solu-
tion concept as σi(av | xpa(v);β) where β is the set of parameters that specify how
σi was determined via the solution concept.
The combination of a MAID (G,X, p, {ui}) and a solution concept specifies the
conditional distributions at all the nodes of the DAG G. Accordingly it specifies a
joint probability distribution
p(xV) =
∏
v∈N
p(xv | xpa(v))
∏
i=1,...,n
∏
v∈Di
σi(av | xpa(v)) (4)
=
∏
v∈V
p(xv | xpa(v)) (5)
where we abuse notation and denote σi(av | xpa(v)) by p(xv | xpa(v)) whenever
v ∈ Di.
In the usual way, once we have such a joint distribution over all variables, we
have fully defined the joint distribution over X and therefore defined conditional
probabilities of the states of one subset of the nodes in the MAID, A, given the
states of another subset of the nodes, B:
p(xA | xB) = p(xA, xB)p(xB)
=
∑
xV\(A∪B) p(xA∪B, xV\(A∪B))∑
xV\B p(xB, xV\B))
(6)
Similarly the combination of a MAID and a solution concept fully defines the con-
ditional value of a scalar-valued function of all variables in the MAID, given the
values of some other variables in the MAID. In particular, the conditional expected
utilities are given by
E(ui | xA) =
∑
xV\A
p(xV\A | xA)ui(xV\A, xA) (7)
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We will sometimes use the term “information structure” to refer to the graph
of a MAID and the conditional distributions at its Nature nodes. (Note that this
is a slightly different use of the term from that used in extensive form games.) In
order to study the effect of changes to the information structure of a MAID, we will
assume that the probability distributions at the Nature nodes are parametrized by
a set of parameters θ, i.e., pv(xv | xpa(v); θ). We are interested in how infinitesimal
changes to θ (and other parameters of the MAID like β) affect p(xV), expected
utilities, mutual information among nodes in the MAID, etc.
2.1 Quantal response equilibria of MAIDs
A solution concept for a game specifies how the actions of the players are chosen.
In our framework, it is not crucial which solution concept is used (so long as the
strategy profile of the players at any θ is differentiable in the interior of Θ). For
convenience, we choose the (logit) quantal response equilibrium (QRE) [25], a
popular model for bounded rationality.10 Under a QRE, each player i does not
necessarily make the best possible move, but instead chooses his actions at the
decision node v ∈ Di from a Boltzmann distribution over his move-conditional
expected utilities:
σi(av | xpa(v)) = 1Zi(xpa(v))e
βiE(ui |av,xpa(v)) (8)
for all av ∈ Xv and xpa(v) ∈∏u∈pa(v)Xu. In this expression Zi(xpa(v)) = ∑a∈Xpa(v) eβiE(ui |a,xpa(v))
is a normalization constant, E(ui|av, xpa(v)) denotes the conditional expected utility
as defined in eq. (7) and βi is a parameter specifying the “rationality” of player i.
This interpretation is based on the observation that a player with β = 0 will
choose her actions uniformly at random, whereas β→ ∞ will choose the action(s)
with highest expected utility, i.e., corresponds to the rational action choice. Thus,
it includes the Nash equilibrium where each player maximizes expected utility as
a boundary case.
As shorthand, we denote the (unconditional) expected utility of player i at some
equilibrium {σi}i=1,...,n, E{σi}i=1,...,n(ui), by Vi.
By using implicit differentiation, it is straight forward to compute partial deriva-
tives governed by the QRE solution concept (see appendix B for details). In par-
ticular, we can compute ∂
∂θi
Vi for the QRE. This is required for the definition of
differential value of information central to the analysis below.
10In addition, the QRE can be derived from information-theoretic principles [30], although we do
not exploit that property of QREs here.
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3 Differential value
Say that we fix all distributions at Nature nodes in a MAID except for some par-
ticular Nature-specified information channel p(xv | xpa(v)), and are interested in
the differential value of mutual information through that channel. In general, the
expected utility of a player i in this MAID is not a single-valued function of the
mutual information in that channel I(Xv; Xpa(v)). There are two reasons for this.
First, the same value of I(Xv; Xpa(v)) can occur for different conditional distribu-
tions p(xv | xpa(v)), and therefore that value of I(Xv; Xpa(v)) can correspond to mul-
tiple values of expected utility in general. Second, as discussed above, even if we
fix the distribution p(xv | xpa(v)), there might be several equilibria (strategy profiles)
all of which solve the QRE equations but correspond to different distributions at
the decision nodes of the MAID.
Evidently then, if v is a chance node in a MAID and i a player in that MAID,
there is no unambiguously defined “differential value to i of the mutual informa-
tion” in the channel from pa(v) to v. We can only talk about differential value
of mutual information at a particular joint distribution of the MAID, a distribu-
tion that both specifies a particular equilibrium of player strategies on one par-
ticular equilibrium branch, and that specifies one particular channel distribution
p(xv | xpa(v)). Once we make such a specification, we can analyze several aspects
of the associated value of mutual information.
Now assume that the channel p(xv|xpa(v); θ) is parameterized by d parameters
θ = (θ1, . . . , θd).11 Then, as motivated in section 1.2 we want to study how in-
finitesimal changes to the parameters effect the value of the player. Consider a
11In the following, we make use of several conventions used in differential geometry (for a thor-
ough introduction to differential geometry we refer the reader to a standard monograph [15]):
• Covariant and contravariant vectors: Vectors are called co- or contravariant depending on
how their coordinate representations change under coordinate transformations. The conven-
tion is to use upper indices for contravariant and lower indices for covariant vectors.
As an example consider a function f (θ) of the game parameters θ = (θ1, . . . , θd). Then, θ is
contravariant, while the partial derivatives ( ∂ f
∂θ1
, . . . , ∂ f
∂θd
) represents a covariant vector.
• Einstein summation convention:
viwi :=
d∑
i=1
viwi (9)
The content of this convention is that a summation sign is omitted when the same index
occurs twice in a product, once as an upper and once as a lower index.
• Metric tensor: The function of the metric tensor is to provide a (Euclidean) scalar product of
tangent vectors, i.e. 〈v,w〉g = gi jviw j.
In particular, the gradient of a function f (θ) has contravariant coordinates (grad f )i = gi j ∂ f
∂θ j
where gi j denotes the inverse of the metric tensor gi j.
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change in the direction δθ. To first order, this changes the value by 〈gradV, δθ〉
and correspondingly we can quantify the differential value of this direction as the
change in value per unit length of δθ:
Definition 2. Let δθ ∈ Rd be a contravariant vector. The (differential) value of
direction δθ at θ is defined as
Vδθ(θ) ≡ 〈grad(V), δθ〉|δθ|
This is the length of the projection of grad(V) in the unit direction δθ. Intuitively,
the direction δθ is valuable to the player to the extent that V increases in this direc-
tion. This is what the value of direction δθ quantifies. (Note that when V decreases
in this direction, the value is negative.)
Using the definitions of gradients and scalar products we can expand
Vδθ(θ) = 〈grad(V), δθ〉|δθ| =
∂
∂θk
Vg(θ)kig(θ)ilδθl√
δθkg(θ)klδθl
=
∂
∂θk
Vδθk√
δθkg(θ)klδθl
(10)
The absence of the metric in the numerator in Eq. (10) reflects the fact that the
vector of partial derivatives ∂
∂θk
V is a covariant vector, whereas δθ is a contravariant
vector.
As discussed above and elaborated below, one important class of directions δθ
at a given game vector θ are gradients of functions f (θ) evaluated at θ, e.g., the
direction gradI(X; S ). However even when the direction δθ we are considering is
not parallel to the gradient of an information-theoretic function f (θ) like mutual
information, capacity or player rationality, we will often be concerned with quanti-
fying the “value” of such a f in that direction δθ. We can do this with the following
definition, related to the definition of differential value of a direction.
Definition 3. Let δθ ∈ Rd be a contravariant vector. The differential value of f
(in direction δθ) at θ is defined as:
V f ,δθ ≡
〈grad(V),δθ〉
|δθ|
〈grad( f ),δθ〉
|δθ|
=
〈grad(V), δθ〉
〈grad( f ), δθ〉 =
∂
∂θi
Vδθi
∂
∂θi
f δθi
This quantity considers the relation between how V and f change when moving
in the direction δθ. If the sign of the differential value of f in direction δθ at θ is
positive, then an infinitesimal step in in direction δθ at θ will either increase both
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V and f or decrease both of them. If instead the sign is negative, then such a step
will have opposite effects on V and f . The size of the differential value of f in
direction δθ at θ gives the rate of change in V per unit of f , for movement in that
direction. Note thatV f ,δθ is independent of the metric because both numerator and
denominator are.
Finally, we define the differential value of information of f without explicitly
specifying a direction. To do this we note that the function f (θ) itself gives rise
to a preferred direction, namely the direction of steepest ascent of f (θ), i.e., the
direction of grad f . Thus, using δθ = grad f in definition 3 we obtain:
Definition 4. The differential value of f at θ is defined as:
V f ≡ 〈gradV, grad f 〉〈gradV, grad f 〉 =
〈gradV, grad f 〉
||grad f ||2 (11)
While this quantity does have units of value per unit of f , as required by the
interpretation as value of information, it is not independent of the metric. Here, the
numerator 〈gradV, grad f 〉 = ∂
∂θi
Vgi j ∂
∂θ j
f as well as the denominator ||grad f ||2 =
∂
∂θi
f gi j ∂
∂θ j
f are metric dependent. For this reason, in the following we will focus
on the metric independent differential value of information in a direction.
4 Properties of differential value
We now present some general results concerning value of a function f : Θ→ R, in
particular conditions for negative values. Throughout this section, we assume that
both f and V are twice continuously differentiable. In addition, note that when we
randomly and independently choose (the directions of) n ≤ d vectors in Rd, they
are linearly independent with probability 1. That means, generically n ≤ d nonzero
vectors span an n-dimensional linear subspace. In the sequel, we shall often im-
plicitly assume that we are in such a generic situation and refrain from discussing
nongeneric situations, that is, situations with additional linear dependencies among
the vectors involved.
Note that generic here refers to the parametrization θ in that changes are not
restricted to a lower-dimensional subspace. Unless noted otherwise, we do not
make any assumptions about the utility function and our results are valid even in
the presence of non-generic symmetries, e.g. zero-sum, of the utility.
4.1 Preliminary definitions
To begin we introduce some particular convex cones (see appendix A for the rel-
evant definitions) that we will use in our analysis of differential value of f for a
single player:
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Definition 5. Define four cones
C++(θ) ≡ {δθ : 〈grad(V), δθ〉 > 0, 〈grad( f ), δθ〉 > 0}
C+−(θ) ≡ {δθ : 〈grad(V), δθ〉 > 0, 〈grad( f ), δθ〉 < 0}
C−+(θ) ≡ {δθ : 〈grad(V), δθ〉 < 0, 〈grad( f ), δθ〉 > 0}
C−−(θ) ≡ {δθ : 〈grad(V), δθ〉 < 0, 〈grad( f ), δθ〉 < 0}.
and also define
C±(θ) ≡ C+−(θ) ∪C−+(θ).
So there are two hyperplanes, {δθ : 〈grad(V), δθ〉 = 0} and {δθ : 〈grad( f ), δθ〉 =
0}, that separate the tangent space at θ into the four disjoint convex cones C++(θ),
C+−(θ), C−+(θ), C−−(θ). These cones are convex and pointed. In fact, each of them
is contained in some open halfspace.
By the definition of the differential value of f in the direction δθ, it is negative
for all δθ in either C+−(θ) or C−+(θ) = −C+−(θ), that is, in C±(θ).
4.2 Geometry of negative value of information
In principle, either the pair of cones C++ and C−− or the pair of cones C+− and C−+
could be empty. That would mean that either all directions δθ have positive value
of f , or all have negative value of f , respectively. We now observe that the latter
pair of cones is nonempty — so there are directions δθ in which the value of f is
negative — iff the gradient of V and f are not parallel.
Proposition 1. Assume that grad(V) and grad( f ) are both nonzero at θ. Then
C+−(θ) and C−+(θ) are nonempty iff
〈gradV(θ), grad f (θ)〉 < |gradV(θ)||grad f (θ)| (12)
Proof. By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality 〈gradV(θ), grad f (θ)〉 ≤ |gradV(θ)||grad f (θ)|
with equality iff and only if gradV and grad f are positive multiples o each other.
Thus, Eq. (12) means that the two vectors grad(V) and grad( f ) are not positively
collinear. It follows from Lemma 5 (see appendix A) that two (nonzero) vectors
v1, v2 are not positively collinear iff Con({v1, v2}) is pointed, i.e., iff there are points
in neither Con({v1, v2}) nor its dual. That in turn is equivalent to there being a third
vector w with
〈v1,w〉 > 0, 〈v2,w〉 < 0. (13)
With v1 = grad(V), v2 = grad( f ), this means that Eq. (12) implies that C+− , ∅,
and therefore C−+ = −C+− , ∅. 
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We emphasize that this result (and other results below) are not predicated on our
use of the QRE or an information-theoretic definition of f . It holds even for other
choices of the solution concept and / or definition of “amount of information” f .
In addition, the requirement in Prop. 1 that θ be in the interior of Θ is actually
quite weak. This is because often if a given MAID of interest is represented by a
θ on the border of Θ in one parametrization of the set of MAIDs, under a different
parameterization the exact same MAID will correspond to a parameter θ in the
interior of Θ.
To illustrate Prop. 1, consider a situation where gradV and grad f are not
parallel at θ, so that grad( f ) 6∝ grad(V). Suppose now, the player is allowed to add
any vector to the current θ that has a given (infinitesimal) magnitude. Then, in order
to increase utility, she would not choose the added infinitesimal vector to be parallel
to grad( f ), i.e., she would prefer to use some of that added vector to improve
other aspects of the game’s parameter vector besides increasing f . Intuitively, so
long as they value anything other than f , we would generically expect there to be
directions that have negative value of f . This holds for any player individually,
independent of possible relations, e.g. zero-sum, between the utilities of different
player. Symmetrically, we would expect directions that have positive value of f :
Corollary 2. Assuming that grad(V) and grad( f ) are both nonzero at θ,
|〈gradV(θ), grad f (θ)〉| < |gradV(θ)||grad f (θ)| (14)
implies that C++(θ) and C−−(θ) are both nonempty.
Proof. Define g(θ) ≡ − f (θ), and write Cg or C f to indicate whether we are con-
sidering spaces defined by V and g or by V and f , respectively.
|〈gradV(θ), grad f (θ)〉| < |gradV(θ)||grad f (θ)|
⇔ |〈gradV(θ), gradg(θ)〉| < |gradV(θ)||gradg(θ)|
⇒ 〈gradV(θ), gradg(θ)〉 < |gradV(θ)||gradg(θ)|
⇔ Cg−+(θ) and Cg+−(θ) are both non-empty
⇔ C f−−(θ) and C f++(θ) are both non-empty
where Prop. 1 is used to establish the second to last equality. 
Note that the converse to Coroll. 2 does not hold. A simple counter-example is
where grad(V)(θ) = grad f (θ), for which both C++(θ) and C−−(θ) are nonempty,
but |〈gradV(θ), grad f (θ)〉| = |gradV(θ)||grad f (θ)|
Coroll. 2 means that so long as |〈gradV(θ), grad f (θ)〉| < |gradV(θ)||grad f (θ)|,
there are directions δθ with positive value of f . This has interesting implications
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for the analysis of value of information in the Braess’ paradox and Cournot exam-
ple of negative value of information, as discussed below in Sec. 5.3. It also means
that even if for some particular f of interest one intuitively expects that increasing
f should reduce expected utility, generically there will be infinitesimal changes to
θ that will increase f but increase expected utility. An illustration of this is also
discussed in the “negative value of utility” example in Sec. 5.3.
4.3 Genericity of negative value of information
Consider situations where f is a monotonically increasing function of V across
a compact S ⊆ Θ. This means that f and V have the same level hypersurfaces
across S (although, of course the values of V and f on any such common level
hypersurface will in general be different). The monotonicity implies that the linear
order induced by values f (θ) relates the level hypersurfaces in the same way that
the linear order induced by values V(θ) relates those level hypersurfaces. Say that
in addition neither grad( f ) nor grad(V) equals 0 anywhere in S . So grad(V) and
grad( f ) are proportional to one another throughout S (although the proportionality
constant may change).12 So, by Prop. 1, for no θ in S is there a direction δθ such
thatV f ,δθ(θ) < 0.
In general though, level hypersurfaces will not match up throughout a region, as
the condition that grad(V) and grad( f ) be proportional is very restrictive and spe-
cial, and so is typically violated. When they do not, we have points in that region
that have directions with negative value of f . We now derive a criterion involving
both the gradients and the Hessians of V and f to identify such a mismatch.
Proposition 3. Assume that both f and V are analytic at θ with nonzero gradients,
and choose some  > 0. Define
ν ≡ gradV(θ)
φ ≡ grad f (θ)
B(θ) ≡ {σ : dist(σ, θ) < }
12Hypothesize that the gradients were not parallel at some θ ∈ S . Since neither gradient equals
zero, this would mean that there is a direction δθ ∈ S that has zero inner product with grad f at θ
but not with grad(V) there. δθ would lie in the level surface of f going through θ but not the level
surface of V going through θ. This would contradict the supposition that those level surfaces are
coincident throughout S .
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Then
C+−(θ′) = ∅ ∀ θ′ ∈ B(θ) (15)
⇒ ν ∝ φ and
∣∣∣∣∣∇∇( f ) − |φ||ν| ∇∇(V)
∣∣∣∣∣νiν j|ν|2 = [∇∇( f )]ij − |φ||ν| [∇∇(V)]ij
(16)
where the proportionality constant in Eq. (16) is greater than zero.
Proof. We start with an observation. Whereas the two vectors grad(V) and grad( f )
depend on the metric, the question of whether those two vectors are collinear does
not depend on the choice of metric. (This is in contrast to the question of whether
they are orthogonal, which needs a metric.) However as these two vectors depend
on the metric, and as we shall have to take derivatives and therefore cannot stay in
a single tangent space, we shall have to employ some of the differential geometry
concepts reviewed in the appendix.
Hypothesize that C±(θ′) = ∅. From Prop. 1 this is true iff grad(V)(θ′) and
grad( f )(θ′) are positively proportional, that is,
grad( f )(θ′) = ρ(θ′)grad(V)(θ′) (17)
for some positive function ρ. So using the definitions in the proposition, ρ(θ) = |φ||ν| .
In addition, if (15) holds, we can lower both the contravariant vector field grad f
and the contravariant vector field grad(V) in (17) into covariant vector fields, and
then apply the covariant derivative operator with respect to θ′ to both sides. If we
then raise all lower indices back up to upper indices, we derive
[∇∇ f (θ′)]i, j − ρ(θ′)[∇∇V(θ′)]i, j = [gradρ(θ′)]i[grad(V)(θ′)] j (18)
Since both Hessians in this equation are the covariant Hessians, and therefore
symmetric with respect to i, j, we conclude by symmetrization that
[gradρ(θ′)]i[grad(V)(θ′)] j = [gradρ(θ′)] j[grad(V)(θ′)]i (19)
for all pairs (i, j). So in particular, evaluating all terms at the center of the ball,
θ′ = θ, we see that
[gradρ] j
[grad(V)] j
=
[gradρ]i
[grad(V)]i
(20)
for all i, j such that [grad(V)]i , 0 and [grad(V)] j , 0. Accordingly [gradρ]i ∝
[grad(V)]i for all i such that [grad(V)]i , 0 where the proportionality constant is
26
independent of i. So evaluating at θ′ = θ and by the above proportionality, (18)
simplifies to
[∇∇ f ]i, j − |φ||ν| [∇∇V]
i, j = k[grad(V)]i[grad(V)] j (21)
for some scalar k. Taking norms of both sides, yields
k =
∣∣∣∣∣∇∇ f − |φ||ν|∇∇V ∣∣∣∣∣
|ν|2 , (22)
whence (16).

We will refer to the matrix with entries∣∣∣∣∣∇∇ f − |φ||ν| ∇∇V
∣∣∣∣∣νiν j|ν|2 − [∇∇ f ]ij + |φ||ν| [∇∇ f ]ijV
as the second-order mismatch. 13 Prop. 3 means that if there is nonzero second-
order mismatch at some θ then C+−(θ) cannot be empty throughout a d-dimensional
sphere centered at θ. In other words, it means that for any  > 0, there is some θ′
within distance  of θ and associated direction δθ′ such that at θ′ there are negative
values of f in direction δθ′.14
In the light of this, arguably the most important issues to analyze in any given
game is not whether at some particular θ there is a direction in which some par-
ticular type of information increases but expected utility decreases. That is almost
13 One might think that so long as the Hessian of V at θ is not a constant times the Hessian of f
at θ, then the level curves of V and f will not match up throughout the vicinity of θ. Such mismatch
in the level curves would in turn imply that even if the gradients of V and f were parallel at θ, there
would be points infinitesimally close to θ where the gradients of V and of f are not parallel. If this
reasoning were valid, it would suggest that the condition in Prop. 3 that the second-order mismatch
is non-zero could be tightened (by replacing that condition with the requirement that Di jF ,
|φ|
|ν|Di jV)
and yet the implication given by that proposition — that there are points where the gradients are not
parallel — would still follow. This is not the case though: Even if the Hessian of V is not a constant
times the Hessian of f at θ, it is possible that the gradients of f and V are parallel throughout a
neighborhood of θ. As a simple example, take d = 2,V(θ) = θ1, f (θ) = (1 + [θ1])2. Even though the
Hessian of this V is not a constant times the Hessian of this f anywhere near the origin, the gradients
of f and V are parallel everywhere near the origin.
14 However it is still possible for C+−(θ) to be empty throughout a (d − 1)-dimensional hyperplane
T going through θ. As an example, choose d = 2,V(θ) = θ1, f (θ) = (1 + θ1)2(1 + [θ2]2). The second
order mismatch is nonzero for this V and f at θ = (0, 0). (The Hessian of f at the origin is twice the
identity matrix, the Hessian of V there is the zero matrix, but νiν j only has one non-zero entry, for
i = j = 1.) However everywhere on the line {θ′ = t(1, 0) : t ∈ R} going through the origin, grad f (θ′)
and grad(V)(θ′) are parallel.
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always the case. Rather our results redirect attention to different issues. One such
issue is what fraction of all θ and all possible infinitesimal changes to θ have neg-
ative value of information.
Another important issue arises whenever there are constraints on the allowed
directions in Θ specifying how θ is changed. Such constraints are quite common
in the real world. As an example, there might be inequality constraints on the
information capacity of a channel, which would manifest themselves in constraints
on the allowed change in parameter space for θ for which those constraints are
tight. Another example of a constraint on the allowed change to the parameter
vector is the stipulation that the change must be an insertion (or removal) of a
garbling node, in the sense of Blackwell’s theorem [22]. With such constraints,
in general the directions in the sets C+−(θ) and C−+(θ) arising in Prop. 1 may all
violate the constraints, and so not be allowed. This is why, for example, the result
of Blackwell (that there are no garbling nodes that one can insert just before a
decision node in an ID that increase maximal expected utility for a rational player)
is consistent with our results; the insertion of such a garbling node corresponds to
a constrained change in θ, a change that lies in a cone that does not intersect C±(θ)
(see Fig. 3).
4.4 Pareto negative values of information
Recall that Prop. 1 established that there are directions in which the value of f is
negative for player i iff grad f and gradVi are not positively proportional. We can
generalize this to give a condition for there to be directions in which the value of
f is negative for all players, in which case we say that we have “Pareto negative
values of information”. To make this precise, define Vif ,δθ(θ) as the value of f in
direction δθ to player i in a MAID.
Proposition 4. Given a set of functions Vi : Θ → R, define C ≡ Con({grad(Vi)}).
Assume C⊥ , ∅. Then
grad( f ) < C
⇔ ∃ δθ : V if ,δθ(θ′) < 0 ∀i (23)
where all N + 1 gradients are evaluated at θ.
Proof. Note that the dual cone Con(grad f )⊥ = H−(grad f ). So by Lemma 7 (see
appendix A), since C⊥ is nonempty, C⊥ ⊆ H−(grad( f )) iff grad( f ) ∈ C. Thus,
grad( f ) < C means that the set difference C⊥ \ H−(grad( f )) is nonempty. Since
those two sets are defined by strict inequalities, this set difference is open. So in fact
grad( f ) < C iff there is some δθ such that both δθ ∈ C⊥ and δθ < cl[H−(grad( f ))],
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the closure of H−(grad( f )). For that δθ, 〈δθ,Vi〉 < 0 for all i, but 〈δθ, grad( f )〉 >
0. This means V if ,δθ(θ) < 0 for all i. This argument also works in the converse
direction. 
The existence condition in Prop. 4 is crucial. To give a simple example, note that if
gradV1 = −gradV2, then even if grad f < C, there is no direction δθ such that both
V1f ,δθ(θ) < 0 andV2f ,δθ(θ) < 0.15 The reason this is not a counterexample to Prop. 4
is that C⊥ is empty in this case. An simple example where such a situtation arises
would be a constant-sum game, i.e.
∑
i ui(θ) = c for all θ16. Then, Con({grad(Vi)})
is not pointed since gradV1 = −∑Ni=2 gradVi and so, by Lemma 6, C⊥ = ∅.
When the condition in Prop. 4 holds, there is a direction from θ that is Pareto-
improving, yet reduces f . So for example, if that condition holds for a particular
set of MAIDs when f is the information capacity of a channel in the MAID, then
all players would benefit from reducing the capacity of that channel.
Similarly, to the second order mismatch condition above which implies that
negative value of information is rather generic, the conditions of Prop. 4 are ex-
pected to hold if the number of players N is less than the dimension d of the pa-
rameter space Θ. Simply observe that Con({grad(Vi)}) is spanned by N vectors and
thus of at most dimension N < d. Now, it is rather non-generic that an unrelated
vector, e.g. grad( f ), happens to lie in this lower-dimensional subspace. Thus, in
this case, Pareto improving changes to θ which decrease the value of f should be
prevalent.17
Note that the bit of whether or not grad( f ) ∈ Con({grad(Vi)} is a covariant
quantity. So the implications of Prop. 4 do not change if we change the coordinate
system. In fact, the value of that bit is independent of our choice of the metric, so
long as no grad(Vi) is in the kernel of the metric.
A similar result, can be obtained for Pareto positive value of information. By
Def. 3, for any i, V i− f ,δθ(θ
′) < 0 iff V if ,δθ(θ
′) > 0. So an immediate corollary of
Prop. 4 is that that whenever C⊥ , ∅, there a direction δθ in which V if ,δθ(θ
′) > 0 ∀i
iff −grad( f ) < C. So if C⊥ , ∅, then if in addition the negative of the gradient
15To see this, note that if there were such a δθ, it could not lie in H0(grad(V)1), and so must
either lie in H−(grad(V)1) or H+(grad(V)1) = H−(grad(V)2). Wolog assume the former. Then
V1f ,δθ(θ) < 0 would require that δθ ∈ H+(grad f ). However δθ ∈ H−(grad(V)1) = H+(grad(V)2)
would then forceV2f ,δθ(θ) > 0.
16Note that if the sum of the utilities of the players depends on θ, Con({grad(Vi)}) could be pointed
even though the game is constant sum for any particular θ (albeit with a different constant). Thus,
The character of games infinitesimally close to θ is what is important.
17However it is important to remember that Pareto-improving changes to θ are not the same thing
as Pareto-improving changes to a strategy profile in a game specified by a single θ. We can have
Pareto-improving changes to θ even if θ specifies a game in which there are no Pareto-improving
changes to the equilibrium strategy profile.
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of f is not contained in the conic hull of the gradients of the players’ expected
utilities, there is a direction in which we can change the game parameter vector
which will increase both f and expected utility for all players.
5 Examples of differential value
5.1 Decision problem
As a first example to illustrate our approach we consider a game involving a single
player. In such a decision problem one agent plays against Nature. (So this MAID
is the special case of an influence diagram.) A simple example, which we will use
to illustrate our notion of differential value of information is shown in Fig. 2.
X S A
U
Figure 2: A simple decision situation.
In this MAID there is a state of Nature random variable X taking on values x
according to a distribution p(x). The agent observes x indirectly through a noisy
channel that produces a value s of a signal random variable S according to a prob-
ability distribution p(s | x; θ) parametrized by θ. The agent then takes an action,
which we write as the value a of the random variable A, according to the distribu-
tion σ(a | s). Finally, the utility u(x, a) is a function that depends only on x and
a.
Here, we consider a simple setup using a binary state of Nature p(X = 0) =
p(X = 1) = 12 and a binary channel p(s|x; θ) with parameters θ = (1, 2) specifying
the transmission errors for the two inputs
p(s|x; θ) =

1 − 1 if x = 0, s = 0
1 if x = 0, s = 1
2 if x = 1, s = 0
1 − 2 if x = 1, s = 1
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The player has two moves and obtains utility
u(x, a) =

0 x = 0, a = 0
−2 x = 0, a = 1
0 x = 1, a = 0
1 x = 1, a = 1
Thus, the player has a safe action A = 0, but can obtain a higher utility by playing
1 when she is certain enough that the state of Nature is 1.
We will refer to this MAID as the Blackwell ID, since it corresponds to the
situation analyzed by Blackwell. A fully rational decision maker will set σ(a | s)
to maximize the expected utility. Here, to have a differentiable strategy, we assume
that the agent is not fully rational but plays a quantal best response with a finite β:
σ(a|s) = 1
Z(s)
eβE(u|s,a;θ)
where Z(s) =
∑
a eβE(u|s,a;θ) and E(u | s, a; θ) denotes the conditional expected
utility for a given signal s and action a.
Fig. 3 show the isoclines of the mutual information I(X; S ) and the expected
utility V(β, 1, 2) for β = 5. Both mutual information and expected utility improve
with decreasing channel noise, i.e. with reducing 1 and/or 2. Nevertheless, the
isoclines of these quantities do not exactly match. Thus it is possible to change
the channel parameters such that the expected utility increases while the mutual
information decreases. As an example, consider any parameter combination (1, 2)
where the isoclines plotted in Fig. 3 intersect. Moving into the region “above” the
MI isocline and below the V isocline will increase V while decreasing MI.
This potential inconsistency between changes to mutual information and changes
to expected utility does not violate Blackwell’s theorem. That is because we allow
arbitrary changes to the channel parameters; those that result in the inconsistency
which cannot be represented as garbling in the sense of Blackwell. As an illustra-
tion, for one particular pair of game parameter values, the set of channels which
are more or less informative according to Blackwell’s partial order are visualized
as the light and dark gray regions in fig. 3 respectively.
This potential for an inconsistency between changes to information and util-
ity is also illustrated by considering the gradient vectors gradI(X; S ) and grad(V)
which are orthogonal to the isoclines (wrt/ the Fisher metric)18. By Prop. 1, only if
18Consider a (joint) distribution p(x; θ) that is parameterized by θ. Then, the Fisher information
metric gi j is defined as
gi j =
∑
x
p(x; θ)
∂ log p(x; θ)
∂θk
∂ log p(x; θ)
∂θl
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those gradients are collinear is it the case that every change to the game parameter
vector increasing the expected utility must necessarily increase the mutual infor-
mation. However in Fig. 3 we clearly see that these gradients giving the directions
of steepest ascent of I(X; S ) and V are different. Thus, locally we can always find
directions with negative value of information. Note that this does not mean that the
agent prefers less information globally, i.e. there is no path, along which the value
of information is strictly negative, from no information, e.g. 1 = 2 = 12 to full
information (1 = 2 = 0).
Conversely, Cor. 2 implies that we can find infinitesimal changes to the game
parameters that cause both expected utility and mutual information to increase, in
agreement with Blackwell’s theorem. In the present example, such changes arise
if we simultaneously reduce both channel noises, e.g. by moving directly towards
the origin.
5.2 Leader-follower example
Next, we turn to a simple games involving two players, namely a leader A1 and a
follower A2 (see Fig. 4). In contrast to the single-player game, now the distri-
bution p(X) of the state of Nature is replaced by the equilibrium strategy σ(a1) of
player 1, a strategy that will also depend on the parameters θ. Another difference
is that there are now two utility functions, one for each player.
As in the decision problem, we consider binary state spaces and an asymmetric
binary channel with parameters θ = (1, 2). We use the utility functions of the
players analyzed in [4]19
follower
u1/u2 L R
le
ad
er L (5, 2) (3, 1)
R (6, 3) (4, 4)
Bagwell pointed out that in the pure strategy Nash equilibria the leader can only
take advantage of moving first (by playing L), when the follower can observe his
move perfectly (Stackelberg solution). As soon as the slightest amount on noise
is added to the channel only the equilibrium of the simultaneous move game (both
playing R, the Cournot solution) remains20. Here we show that our differential
The statistical origin of the Fisher metric lies in the task of estimating a probability distribution from
a family parametrized by θ from observations of the variable x. The Fisher metric expresses the
sensitivity of the dependence of the family on θ, that is, how well observations of x can discriminate
among nearby values of θ.
19The game is a discretization of the Stackelberg duopoly game, with two moves for each player.
20There are additional mixed equilibria, which change smoothly with the noise. These are men-
tioned in Bagwell [4], but not discussed further.
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Figure 3: Isoclines of expected utility V and mutual information I(X; S ) with
corresponding gradient vectors showing the directions of steepest ascent (wrt/ the
Fisher metric). The gray regions show which channels are more informative (dark
gray) or less informative (light gray) than the channel with noise parameters (1 =
0.17, 2 = 0.22), in the sense of the term arising in Blackwell’s analysis.
analysis uncovers a much richer structure. In particular, we show there exist a
QRE branch and parameters for the noise of the channel such that both players
prefer more noise.
In the decision case, we used I(X; S ) to quantify the amount of information
that is available to the (single) player. In the multi-player game setting, the cor-
responding quantity is I(A1; S ), and strongly depends on the move of the leader.
As an illustration, consider a symmetric channel p(s|a1) parametrized by the single
value  ≡ 1,2. Fig. 5 shows how the strategy of the leader depends on the channel
noise and the rationality β = β1,2 of the players. This shows that for sufficiently
rational players (β > 5) there exist multiple QRE solutions. For β → ∞ the three
QRE equilibria converge to the pure strategy Nash equilibrium where both play R
(Cournot outcome, lower branch in red/green) and to the two mixed strategy Nash
equilibria of the original game, respectively.21 For  = 0, the upper mixed strategy
21This demonstrates that our analysis can easily be extended to analyze Nash equilibria. In this
case, choosing a branch corresponds to choosing a particular equilibrium, and the partial derivatives
∂σ
∂i
vanish, as long as the equilibrium exists.
33
A1 S A2
U2
U1
Figure 4: A 2-player game where player A1 (leader) can move before player A2
(follower).
equilibrium coincides with the equilibrium mentioned above where the leader has
an advantage. In the following, we focus on the branch that smoothly connects
to the origin β = 0, the so-called “principal branch”, which includes that upper
equilibrium.
Fig 6 shows the channel capacity as a function of the conditional distribution in
the channel, as well as the mutual information I(A1; S ) that is actually transferred
across the channel. As soon as the leader is rational enough, he starts to prefer
the move L. This means that the mutual information I(A1; S ) decreases when the
leader gets rational enough.22 However, the potential information that could be
transferred, i.e., the channel capacity, is independent of player strategies, and so
is still high. This illustrates how studying the information capacity rather than the
mutual information is perhaps more in line with standard game theory, where the
information partition is considered as part of the specification of the game parame-
ters, independent of the resultant player strategies. For these reasons we focus our
analysis on the channel capacity.
In this simple symmetric-channel scenario the space of game parameters con-
cerning the channel noise is one-dimensional, and so analyses of “gradients” over
that space are not particularly illuminating. Accordingly, to further investigate
the role of information in the leader-follower game we consider an asymmetric
channel, so that p(s|a1) is parametrized by two noise parameters, 1, 2, giving the
probability of error for the two inputs a1 = L and a1 = R respectively. We also fix
22Remember that I(A1; S ) = Ep(A1)[DKL(p(S |a1) || p(S ))] and thus it vanishes if the leader plays a
pure strategy, since the average becomes trivial.
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Figure 5: Surface of QRE equilibria for the symmetric channel leader-follower
game.
β = 10 for both players. In this case, we again find multiple QRE branches when
the channel noise is small enough. We focus on the branch where the leader has
the biggest advantage and can achieve the highest utility while the utility of the fol-
lower is lowest. In the following, we refer to this QRE solution as the “Stackelberg
branch”.
Fig. 7 A shows the isoclines of expected utility for both leader and follower,
the isoclines of the channel capacity, and the corresponding gradient fields, all
on the Stackelberg branch. We immediately see that the gradients are nowhere
collinear. So from Prop. 1 we know that for all values of the game parame-
ters, the channel noises can be infinitesimally changed such that the capacity in-
creases whereas the expected utility (of either the leader or follower) decreases.23
More interestingly, the gradient field shows that everywhere grad[Capacity] <
Con({grad(V)1, gradV2}). Thus by Prop. 4, there must be directions such that
both players are better off and yet the channel capacity decreases when the game is
moved in that direction. As before, while this is true locally, it does not mean that
both players prefer less information globally.
Simply by redefining f as the negative of the capacity as the function of in-
terest (which amounts to flipping the corresponding gradient vectors in our fig-
ures), the same condition in Prop. 4 can be used to identify regions of channel
23By Prop. 3 this behavior is rather generic and thus expected.
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Figure 6: Channel capacity and mutual information I(A1; S ) in the symmetric
channel leader-follower game.
parameter space where (there are directions in which we can move the game pa-
rameters in which) both players prefer more capacity. Now grad(−Capacity) ∈
Con({grad(V)1, grad(V)2}), except for a small region in the upper left corner (con-
taining for example the point (1 = 0.05, 2 = 0.35)). So we can immediately
conclude that there are no such directions, for all parameter values outside this
region.
To illustrate the effect of our choice of which equilibrium branch to analyze,
Fig. 7 B shows the corresponding isoclines on the branch just below the Stack-
elberg branch. Again, the gradient vectors are nowhere aligned. However now
grad[Capacity] ∈ Con({grad(V)1, gradV2}). Thus, we can conclude that on this
branch there are no directions where both players prefer a decrease in channel ca-
pacity, in contrast to the case on the Stackelberg branch.
Summarizing, even in rather simple leader-follower games, there is a surpris-
ingly complicated underlying geometric structure. However just like in the decision-
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Figure 7: Isoclines of the expected utilities for the leader and the follower as well
as the channel capacity in the asymmetric channel scenario, on the Stackelberg
branch (A) and on the branch just below it in the space of leader strategies (B). The
expected utility levels are color-coded and the channel capacity (dotted) increases
towards the origin (lower-left corner). The gradient vectors show the corresponding
directions of steepest ascent (wrt/ the Fisher metric).
theoretic scenario, our theorems provide general conditions on the gradient vec-
tors in leader-follower games that determine regions of channel parameter space
in which there is negative value of information for both players. Moreover, these
conditions are easily checked. In particular, they do not require laboriously com-
paring different information partitions to get non-numeric partial orders. Instead
our conditions are based on cardinal quantifications of how much the players value
infinitesimal changes to the information structure of the game, measured in units
of utility per bits of information.
This kind of analysis can be applied multiple times at once, to quantify how
much the players value different candidate changes to the information structure
of the game. These quantifications are all measured in the same units, of utility
per bits of information. So we can use their values to evaluate marginal rates
of substitution of various kinds of changes to the game’s information structure.
More generally, we can apply our analysis to quantify how much the players value
different candidate infinitesimal changes to any aspects of the game specification,
e.g., to parameters in utility functions. This allows us to evaluate marginal rates of
substitution of all aspects of the game specification. This is the subject of future
research.
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5.3 Illustrative examples
To illustrate the generality of our framework, in this section we present additional
examples, emphasizing the implications of our results in Sec. 4 for several different
economic scenarios.
Example 1. Consider a variant of the well-known scenario where a decision by
an individual is a costly signal to a prospective employer of their capability as
employees. In this variant there is a car repair chain that wants to hire a new
mechanic. (So we have two players.) There is an applicant for the position who has
some pre-existing ability at car repair. That ability is their type; it is determined by
a prior distribution that neither player can affect. The repair chain cannot directly
observe the applicant’s ability. So instead, they will give the applicant a written
test of their knowledge of cars. The repair chain will then use the outcome of that
test to decide whether to offer the job to the applicant and if so, at what salary.
(The idea is that giving too low a salary to a new mechanic will raise the odds that
after being trained by the repair chain that new mechanic would simply leave for
a different repair chain, at a cost to the repair chain.)
The applicant will study before they take the test. The harder they study, the
greater the cost to them. There is also a conditional distribution of how they do on
the test given their ability to repair cars and how hard they study. The fact that that
distribution is not a single-valued map means it is a noisy information channel,
from the studying decision of the applicant to the outcome of the test.
Suppose that the repair chain feels frustrated by the fact that the test gives them
a noisy signal of the applicant’s ability to repair cars. Knowing this, a test-design
company approaches the repair chain, and offers to sell them a new test that has
a double-your-money back guarantee that it is less noisy than the current test (for
some functional of how “noisy” a test is that the test company and repair chain
both use). Thinking they will get double their money back if they buy the new test
but have lower expected utility, the repair chain buys the test.24
Our results show that generically, there are ways that the repair chain will have
lower expected utility with the new test — but not be able to invoke the guarantee
to get any money back from the test-design company, since the new test is less noisy
than the old one. That is, there are directions δθ in the parameters describing how
24Formally, in this example we must assume that the applicant knows nothing about this option
that the repair chain has to buy a new test before examining the applicant. Rather the applicant is
simply informed about the conditional distributions specifying the accuracy of the test — whatever
they are —- before the applicant considers the test. If instead the applicant knew that the repair chain
has the option to purchase the new test, it would mean that we have to consider an expanded version
of the original game, in which the applicant must predict whether the repair chain purchases the new
test, etc.
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Figure 8: MAID for the noisy signalling game described in example 1 (panel A)
and the leader-follower game from section 5 (panel B).
the test is designed, such that the test is made more accurate, but less useful for the
repair chain, i.e. it has a negative value of information.
The MAID corresponding to this noisy signaling game is shown in Fig. 8 A.
For comparison, panel B reproduces the MAID for the leader-follower game that
was studied in section 5. In the noisy signaling game there is an additional Nature
node T which player 1 (the applicant) can observe, but that player 2 (the car repair
chain) cannot observe. Another difference is that now the utility of both players
depends in part on the outcome of Nature’s choice. Since the applicant incurs a
cost if she studies, her utility directly depends on her move (study hard or party).
However the utility of the repair chain does not depend directly on the move of the
applicant.
We now present a variant of Braess’ paradox [9] which provides a particularly
striking example of how extra information can simultaneously hurt all players of
a game, even in the case of many players. Braess’ paradox is a “paradox” that
arises in congestion games over networks. Although it has arisen in the real world
in quite complicated transportation networks, it can be illustrated with a very sim-
ple network. We illustrate in this next example, before presenting our variant of
Braess’ paradox.
Example 2. Consider a scenario where there are 4000 players, all of whom must
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commute to work at the same time, from a node “Start” on a network to a node
“End”. Say that there are a total of four roadways between Start and End that all
the players know exist. (See Fig. 9.)
Figure 9: Network exhibiting Braess’ paradox. The symbols are explained in the
text.
The move of each player is a choice of what route they will follow to get to
work. There are two choices they can make. The first is the route Start-A-End, and
the second is the route Start-B-End. The number of minutes it takes each player
to follow their chosen route is illustrated in Fig. 9. In that figure, t indicates the
amount of time it takes a player to cross the associated road. In addition, T refer
to the total number of players (out of 4000) who follow the associated road. So on
those two roads where t = T/100, the greater the amount of traffic t, the slower
the players can drive, and so the greater the amount of time T it takes to cross the
road. In contrast, it takes 45 minutes to traverse the other two roads, regardless of
the amount of traffic on the roads.
The paradox arises, if a new highway from A to B (dashed) is opened which
takes only 4 minutes to traverse. Now, each player has a third option, namely to
take the route Start-A-B-End. So we have a new game.
It is straightforward to verify that in all Nash equilibria of the original game,
i.e. the game without the new highway, exactly half of the players choose Start-A-
End, and half choose Start-B-End. The total cost (i.e., negative utility) to all players
is a 65 minute commute. When the new highway is opened, every player will choose
Start-A-B-End. This increases the travel time of all players to 84 minutes. Thus,
the expected cost for all players rises when they have more possible actions.
Now consider a variant of Braess’ paradox where both games are changed
slightly, so that they only differ in their information structures. In this variant,
the new highway exists in both games, but is closed due to construction with prior
probability of .1. We assume that the cost of 4 minutes is incurred by a player if
they try to go down the new highway both if they are successful and get through
to B, or if they are blocked by the new construction and have to return to A. In
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addition, in both games all players are informed about whether the new highway is
open, but via a noisy signal (e.g. via a newspaper article from several days before
saying when the new highway is schedule to open). The difference between the
games is the amount of noise in that signal.
In the new first game, the signal is completely noisy, providing no information
at all about whether the new highway is open. So the players have to decide their
strategy based purely on the prior probability of .1 that the new highway is open.
It is straightforward to verify that in this case, the Nash equilibrium is for half of
the players to choose Start-A-End, half to choose Start-B-End, and none to try to
go down the new highway. The resultant travel time per player is 65 minutes.25
In contrast, in the new version of the second game, the signal is noise-free. So
with probability .1 the new highway is open, all players know that, and therefore
all take the new highway, for a total travel time of 84 minutes. With probability .9
the new highway is closed, all players know that, and therefore none try to take the
new highway, for a total travel time of 65 minutes. So the expected travel time per
player in the new second game is .1(84) + .9(65).
So the extra information that is available in the new second game, but not in
the new first game, hurts all players.
Note that in contrast to the leader-follower games and noisy signaling games
analyzed above, in our variant of Braess’ paradox the extra information concerns
a move of Nature, not the move of some other player. Nevertheless, our results on
negative value of information still apply. In particular, for any particular player i in
that game, and any precise choice for information-theoretic function f , Prop. 1 tells
us that there are other directions δθ in which we infinitesimally reduce the noise in
the signal about the state of the highway so that information increases and expected
utility for player i goes up. Prop. 3 then tell us that this property is generic, i.e., it is
true for almost all utility functions that differ only slightly from the ones in Ex. 2.
This may have important real-world applications. Computer routing networks
(e.g., networks that route communication packets, jobs, etc.), are typically run in
a distributed fashion where each router adaptively modifies its behavior to try to
optimize its own “utility function” based on noisy signals it receives concerning the
state of the overall network. In addition to arising in human transportation traffic
networks, Braess’ paradox often arises in such computer routing networks [28].
This has led to a large body of work on how to redesign the adaptive algorithms
used by the routers to avoid the paradox and associated loss of expected utility
25In particular, if any of the players in this strategy profile who choose Start-A-End were to change
their choice to try to go down the new highway, their new expected travel time would be .1(24 +
20.01) + .9(24 + 45) = 66.5, which is greater than 65, their travel time if they stick with their original
strategy.
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[31, 29]. Our analysis suggests that it should be possible to avoid Braess’ paradox
— and indeed to increase the expected utility — without redesigning the routing
algorithms, but instead changing the signals the routers receive concerning the state
of the network.
6 Future work
In this paper we primarily used our geometric framework to analyze the relation-
ship between changes in information and associated changes in expected utility.
However the framework is far more broadly applicable. It can be used to ana-
lyze the relationship between expected utilities and any function f (θ) that depends
on the parameters specifying the game. f is not restricted to be an information-
theoretic function.
As a particularly simple illustration of this breadth of the applicability of our
framework, we can use it to analyze the relationship between expected utility and a
function f (θ) that simply returns one of the components of θ. This analysis reveals
what might be called scenarios with “negative value of utility”:
Example 3. This example concerns a simultaneous move game of two players,
who have two possible moves each. The bimatrix of the game is as follows:
L R
T (1,4) (4-θ,1)
B (2,2) (3,3)
where θ ≥ 0 is a parameter adjusting the utility of the row player.
With θ < 1 this game has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The unique Nash
equilibrium of this game is a mixed equilibrium with the row player playing top
with pT = 14 and the column player playing left with pL =
1−θ
2−θ = 1 − 12−θ . Since
the column player is indifferent between L and R at the equilibrium, the expected
utility Vcol is 52 independent of θ. While the row player has an expected utility of
Vrow = 5−2θ2−θ .
Now, ∂Vrow∂θ =
1
(2−θ)2 is strictly positive which means that the row player prefers
θ too increase. At the same time, this reduces her utility for the outcome T,R and
thus, one could say that the row player has a negative value of utility.26
26As an aside, this phenomenon can be exploited by an external party who can enter a publicly
visible binding contract with Row under which Row must pay the tax to the external party, to the
benefit of both Row and that external party. This is an example of an external party “mining” a
game [7].
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As Ex. 3 illustrates, our framework allows us to quantify the value of any in-
finitesimal change in the change in any function f (θ) induced by by an infinitesi-
mal change in the game parameter. Indeed, we can evaluate such a value even if
the induced change in f (θ) is indirect, arising via the effect of the change in θ on
the player strategy profile that is mediated by the equilibrium concept (as in the
leader-follower game from Sec. 5 and as in Ex. 2).
This breadth of quantities whose “value” can be evaluated using our framework
allows us to analyze the trade-offs, inherent in a game, among multiple changes to
the parameters specifying that game and/or functions of those parameters. These
trade-offs can be used to calculate marginal rates of substitution, in which we com-
pare the values assigned by a single player to different changes in the game param-
eter. Assuming transferrable utility, they can also be used to compare the values
assigned by different players to the same change in the game parameter. Under
that assumption they can even be used to compare the values assigned by different
players to different changes in the game parameter. For example, with our frame-
work we can quantify the relationship between the value to player i of changes to
the information capacity of one information channel in a game, and the value to a
separate player j , i of changes to i’s utility function in that game. Similarly, by
considering the QRE rationality parameter β as a component of the game param-
eter θ, we can study the value of rationality and its relations with values of other
quantities. This allows us to do things like quantify the relationship between extra
rationality by player i and extra information available to that player. Colloquially,
“i’s knowing this much more about certain utility-relevant quantities before they
make their move is equivalent to their being this much smarter when they make
that move”. Future work involves making a detailed investigation of these kinds of
trade-offs.
Another issue we intend to investigate in future work is “second-order effects”.
Changing the parameter of a game θ infinitesimally can affect the value of every
function g : θ ∈ Θ → R, not just functions like expected utilities, mutual infor-
mation, etc. In particular, this is true if g is the differential value of some f (θ)
evaluated at θ′. Changing θ will not just change the expected utility of player i and
what f (θ) is; it will also change the differential value to player i of changes to f .
As an example, changing the conditional distribution specifying one information
channel in a game will in general change the differential value of a different infor-
mation channel. In future work we hope to investigate these second order effects
and whether they depend on “second-order” properties of the geometric structure
of the game, like the Ricci curvature tensor of the Fisher metric.
Since in general games have multiple equilibria, it is often impossible to in-
finitesimally change the game parameter in way that is Pareto-optimal simultane-
ously for all equilibria. In other future work, we intend to investigate the general-
43
izations of Prop. 4 that determine when such changes are possible.
Finally, our framework provides important new capabilities for policy making
or mechanism design, by providing guidance to a regulator external to a game on
how to modify the components of the game parameter vector that are under their
control. As discussed above, in games with multiple equilibria — arguably the
majority of real-world games of interest to a regulator — it makes sense for the
regulator to determine which equilibrium the players have adopted for a current
value of θ simply by observing how the players are behaving. Using our frame-
work, it may be possible for that regulator to gradually change θ from that starting
value, to move the equilibrium down the branch that has the current equilibrium,
to where it intersects with another branch, and then guide the equilibrium along
that second branch, back to the starting θ. In this way the regulator may be able
to gradually change player behavior to go from a current equilibrium of a game
specified by θ, to a different, Pareto-superior equilibrium for that same θ. In some
situations, the regulator should even be able to design that trajectory through the
space of game parameter vectors so that each infinitesimal change to θ along that
trajectory is Pareto-improving. (See [30] for an example of this kind of approach.)
7 Conclusion
In this paper we introduce a new framework to study the value of information in
arbitrary noncooperative games. Our starting point is the well-established concept
of marginal utility of a good in a decision problem. We present a very natural
way to generalize this, to marginal utility to a player in a noncooperative game
of an arbitrary function of a parameter specifying that game. Interestingly, this
generalization forces us to introduce a metric over the space of game parameters.
In this way we show that geometry is intrinsic to noncooperative game theory, with
each game specifying its own associated Riemannian manifold.
In parallel with this analysis, we consider the issue of how best to quantify
economically relevant aspects of the information structure in that game. We argue
that mutual information is a natural way to do this, using very simple considera-
tions grounded in economics. As we discuss, such a (cardinal) quantification of
information also has several advantages over the partial orders commonly used in
the past to investigate the role of information in games.
We then combine our two analyses into a unified framework. We do this by
taking the “function of a parameter specifying a game” from the first analysis to
be the mutual information that was motivated in our second analysis. This com-
bination of our two analyses reveals how a game’s geometry governs the relation
between changes to its information structure and changes to the expected utilities
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of the players.
We then use our framework to derive general conditions for the existence of
negative value of information. In particular, we show that for almost any game,
there are changes to the information structure of the game that both increase the
information available to any particular player in that game and hurt that player.
We then extend our analysis to characterize the set of games where there are such
changes that simultaneously increase the information available to all players, while
hurting all players. We illustrate our framework with computational analyses of a
single-player decision scenario as well as a two player leader-follower game.
Finally, we note that our framework can by applied to analyze the effects of
arbitrary changes to a game, not just changes to its information structure. As a par-
ticularly simple example, we construct a game that has “negative value of utility”,
in which the expected value of a player’s utility u increases when we change the
game by applying a monotonically decreasing transformation to u. More gener-
ally, the breadth of applicability of our framework allows us to analyze marginal
rates of substitution of different aspects of an information structure, of the utility
functions of the players, or of any other parameters specifying the game the players
are engaged in.
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A Review of conic hulls
In our analysis below we shall work in some tangent space of a parameter manifold
that is equipped with the Fisher metric 〈., .〉. Now, whenever we have a scalar prod-
uct on such a (finite dimensional) vector space, we can perform a linear transforma-
tion of that vector space to turn that scalar product into the standard Euclidean one.
Thus, in our analysis below, we shall essentially be doing elementary Euclidean
geometry, just in a different coordinate system.27 This will be reflected in the fact
that simple graphical pictures and intuition can be used to understand many of our
results.
27The nonlinear nature of the Fisher or any other Riemannian metric only comes into play when
we look at the tangent spaces of several points simultaneously. What linear coordinate transformation
turns the Fisher metric into the Euclidean one will depend on the particular tangent space in which
we are working for a particular θ, and in general, there will be no such transformation that works for
all tangent spaces simultaneously.
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We start by reviewing some simple linear algebra in Euclidean space, that is,
Rd equipped with the Euclidean scalar product 〈., .〉. For a nonzero vector v ∈
Rd, the hyperplane H0(v) = {w : 〈v,w〉 = 0} separates Rd into two halfspaces
H+(v) (H−(v) resp.) ≡ {w : 〈v,w〉 > 0 (< 0 resp.)}, and for two vectors v1, v2 that
are not positively collinear, the associated halfspaces overlap, e.g.,
H+(v1) ∩ H−(v2) , ∅. (24)
When we have several nonzero vectors vi, their conic hull [8] is defined as
Con({vi}) ≡
∑
i
αivi : αi ≥ 0∀i
 (25)
Note that C = Con({vi}) is a cone since whenever v ∈ C, it follows that kv ∈ C
for k > 0. Note also that this cone is convex because whenever v,w ∈ C, then
λv + (1 − λ)w ∈ C for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
A cone C is called pointed if it does not contain any bi-infinite straight line.
The following will be used in the sequel28:
Lemma 5. If the vectors vi are linearly independent, then Con({vi}) is pointed.
Of course, the converse of Lemma 5 does not hold in general, because for all
v ∈ Con({vi}), Con({vi}) = Con({vi} ∪ v).
We will also need to use the definition that the dual to a conic hull Con({vi}) is
Con({vi})⊥ ≡
⋂
i
H−(vi). (26)
Equivalently,
Con({vi})⊥ = {v : 〈v, vi〉 < 0 for all i}. (27)
The following elementary property relating conic hulls and pointedness is used
in the sequel.
Lemma 6. Con({vi}) is not pointed ⇒ [Con({vi})]⊥ = ∅ ⇒ the vectors vi are
linearly dependent.
For any single vector v, Con(v)⊥ = H−(v). In general, when we enlarge the set
of vectors vi, Con({vi}) gets larger whereas the dual conic hull Con({vi})⊥ becomes
smaller. More precisely,
28For the sake of space we omit the proof of this and the following basic properties.
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Lemma 7. Let C,C1,C2 be nonempty convex cones whose duals are nonempty.
Then
C⊥⊥ = C (28)
and
C1 ⊂ C2 ⇔ C⊥2 ⊂ C⊥1 . (29)
The requirement that the duals be non-empty is crucial in this result. For example,
if the second part of Lemma 7 held for empty C⊥, then we would have C⊥ = ∅⇒
C′ ⊂ C for any conic hull C′ ⊆ Rn. The only way this could be would be if
C = Rn. However for any vector v ∈ Rn with n > 2, [Con({v,−v})]⊥ = ∅, even
though [Con({v,−v})] , Rn.
B Partial derivatives of QREs of MAIDs with respect to
game parameters
For computations involving the partial derivatives of the players strategies at a
QRE (branch) it can help to explicitly introduce the normalization constants as
an auxiliary variable. The QRE condition from eq. (8) is then replaced by the
following conditions
σi(av|xpa(v); βi, θ) − e
βiE(ui |av,xpa(v);β,θ)
Zi(xpa(v); βi, θ)
= 0
Zi(xpa(v); βi, θ) −
∑
a∈Xv
eβiE(ui |av,xpa(v);β,θ) = 0
for all players i, decision nodes v ∈ Di and all states av ∈ Xv, xv ∈ ∏u∈Pa(v)Xu.
(Here and throughout this section, subscripts onσ, Z, etc. should not be understood
as specifications of coordinates as in the Einstein summation convention.)
Overall, this gives rise to a total of M equations for M unknown quantities
σi(av|xpa(v)), Zi(xpa(v)). Using a vector valued function f we can abbreviate the
above by the following equation:
f (σβ,θ, Zβ,θ,β, θ) = 0 (30)
where σβ,θ is a vector of all strategies
{σi(av | xv; βi, θ) : i = 1, . . . , n, v ∈ Di, av ∈ Xv, xv ∈
∏
u∈Pa(v)
Xu},
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Zβ,θ collects all normalization constants, and 0 is the vector of all 0’s. Note that
in general, even once the distributions at all decision nodes have been fixed, the
distributions at chance nodes affect the value of E(ui | av, xpa(v);β, θ). Therefore
they affect the value of the function f . This is why f can depend explicitly on θ,
as well as depend directly on β.
The (vector-valued) partial derivative of the position of the QRE in (σθ, Zθ)
with respect to θ is then given by implicit differentiation of eq. (30) :[ ∂σθ
∂θ
∂Zθ
∂θ
]
= −
[
∂ f
∂σθ
∂ f
∂Zθ
]−1
∂ f
∂θ
(31)
where the dependence on β is hidden for clarity, all partial derivatives are evaluated
at the QRE, and we assume that the matrix
[
∂ f
∂σθ
∂ f
∂Zθ
]
is invertible at the point θ
at which we are evaluating the partial derivatives.
These equations give the partial derivatives of the mixed strategy profile. They
apply to any MAID, and allow us to write the partial derivatives of other quantities
of interest. In particular, the partial derivative of the expected utility of any player
i is
∂Vi
∂θ
=
∑
x∈XV
ui(x)
∂p(x; θ)
∂θ
=
∑
x∈XV
ui(x)
∑
v∈V
∂p(xv | xpa(v); θ)
∂θ
∏
v′,v
p(xv′ | xpa(v′); θ)
(32)
where each term ∂p(xv |xpa(v);θ)∂θ is given by the appropriate component of Eq. (31) if
v is a decision node. (For the other, chance nodes, ∂p(xv |xpa(v);θ)∂θ can be calculated
directly). Similarly, the partial derivatives of other functions of interest such as
mutual informations between certain nodes of the MAID can be calculated from
Eq. (31).
Evaluating those derivatives and the additional ones needed for the Fisher met-
ric by hand can be very tedious, even for small games. Here, we used automatic
differentiation [26] to obtain numerical results for certain parameter settings and
equilibrium branches. Note that automatic differentiation is not a numerical ap-
proximation, like finite differences or the adjoint method. Rather it uses the chain
rule to evaluate the derivative alongside the value of the function.
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